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I. INTRODUCTION
The question of the existence of legal protection for foreign
investors under customary international law (or "custom") has always
been controversial. As a result of this perceived lack of established
customary principles, States concluded thousands of bilateral investment
treaties in the 1990s for the promotion and the protection of investments
("BITs"). The number of BITs is now so overwhelming and their scope
so comprehensive that a new debate has recently arisen in doctrine about
the impact of these treaties on the existence of custom in the field of
international investment law. It has been recently argued in doctrine that
these BITs represent the "new" custom in this field. For some writers,
the content of both custom and BITs is now simply just the same.
The first section of the paper examines the interaction between
custom and BITs (II). We will then analyse in detail the proposition that
BITs represent the "new" custom and offers a rebuttal (III). This paper
will survey different arguments to support the view that contemporary
custom does not correspond to the total sum of more than two thousand
BITs. The content of these BITs and custom is clearly different.
Although, taken together these treaties do not represent any "new"
custom, this does not mean that they have a marginal impact on
international investment law. On the contrary, BITs may play an
important role in the consolidation and crystallisation of customary rules
(IV). Finally, we will examine the remaining fundamental importance of
determining the content of rules of custom in the field of international
investment law in this era of BITs proliferation (V).
II. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN CUSTOM AND BITS
Custom is one of the sources of international law. Under Article
38(1)b of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
"international custom" requires a "general practice" that is "accepted as
law."' The question of the treatment to be accorded to foreign investors
under customary international law has been very contentious amongst
1. Art. 38, Statute of the I.C.J., reprinted in International Court of Justice, Charter
of the United Nations, Statute and Rules of Court and other Documents 61 (No. 4 1978).
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States for decades. The debate is summarised as follows by Judge
Schwebel:
Capital-exporting States generally maintained that host States were
bound under international law to treat foreign investment at least in
accordance with the "minimum standard of international law;" and
where the host State expropriated foreign property, it could lawfully
do so only for a public purpose, without discrimination against
foreign interests, and upon payment of prompt, adequate and
effective compensation. Capital importing States maintained that
host States were not in matters of the treatment and taking of foreign
property bound under international law at all; that the minimum
standard did not exist; and that States were bound to accord the
foreign investor only national treatment, only what their domestic law
provided or was revised to provide. The foreign investor whose
property was taken was entitled to no more than the taking State's
law afforded.2
A compromise between these different approaches was eventually
reached in 1962 with the adoption by the United Nations General
Assembly of the Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources affirming the right for host States to nationalise foreign owned
property, but nevertheless requiring "appropriate compensation" in
accordance with international law. 3  The so-called "Hull formula"
supported by developed States and providing for "prompt, adequate and
effective" compensation in the event of expropriation was, however,
rejected by developing States in 1974 with the adoption of the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States by the General Assembly.4 Under
this "New International Economic Order" the requirement to provide
"appropriate compensation" for expropriation still existed, but any
related disputes (or "controversy") had to be "settled under the domestic
law of the nationalising State and by its tribunals" and not by an
international tribunal under international law.5
This heated debate on the issue of compensation for expropriation
illustrates that no broad international consensus emerged on the existing
2. S.M. Schwebel, The United States 2004 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: An
Exercise in the Regressive Development of International Law, 3(2) TRANSNAT'L DisP.
MGMT. 2 (2006).
3. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), 14 Dec. 1962.
4. G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), 12 Dec. 1974. The "Hull formula" was first articulated
by the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, in a letter to its Mexican
counterpart in response to Mexico's nationalisation of U.S. companies in 1936. Mr Hull
argues that international law required "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation for
the expropriation of foreign investments (in GREEN H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 228 (v. 3, 1942).
5. G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), 12 Dec. 1974.
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protection for foreign investors as a result of these persisting differences
of approaches between developed and developing states. The absence of
consensus consequently prevented the development and crystallisation of
rules of customary international law in the field of international
investment law. In the famous 1970 Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ
drew the same conclusion:
Considering the important developments of the last half-century, the
growth of foreign investments and the expansion of international
activities of corporations, in particular of holding companies, which
are often multinational, and considering the way in which the
economic interests of states have proliferated, it may at first sight
appear surprising that the evolution of the law has not gone further
and that no generally accepted rules in the matter have crystallized on
the international plane.
6
The 1990s were marked by a new era of globalisation whereby
private foreign investments were (almost) universally deemed by States
as an essential tool for their economic development.7 At the time,
uncertainty still remained on the types of legal protections existing for
foreign investors under custom. Not surprisingly, efforts by the OECD
to negotiate a comprehensive Multilateral Agreement on Investment
("MAI") in 1995 were unsuccessful.8 As explained by scholars, it is
precisely because "customary law was deemed be too amorphous and not
be able to provide sufficient guidance and protection" to foreign
investors that capital-exporting and developing States started to
frenetically conclude ad hoc BITs. 9 It is now estimated that over 2,500
such BITs have been concluded worldwide (the vast majority in the
1990s).10
6. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J.,
4, at 46-47 (5 February).
7. Thus, the 1992 World Bank GUIDELINES ON THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT explained in its preamble that it "recognizes" that "a greater flow of foreign
direct investment brings substantial benefits to bear on the world economy and on the
economies of developing countries in particular."
8. OECD, Negotiating Group on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Draft
Consolidated Text of 11 February 1998, DAFFE/MAI (98)7, pp. 58-64.
9. R. Dolzer & A. von Walter, Fair and Equitable Treatment-Lines of
Jurisprudence on Customary Law, in INVESTMENT TREATY LAW, CURRENT ISSUES II 99
(F. Ortino ed., 2007).
10. According to UNCTAD, Recent Developments in International Investment
Agreements (2006-June 2007), 3 IIA MONITOR (2007), there were 2,573 treaties at the
end of 2006. It should also be noted that States have also entered a limited number of
multilateral investment agreements at the regional level. For instance, North American
Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter NAFTA], Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993); Energy Charter Treaty, Apr. 16, 1998, 34 I.L.M. 373 (1995).
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The substantive rules for the protection of foreign investments are
found in these bilateral and multilateral investment treaties." Such
investment treaties regulate the treatment of foreign investors and their
investments in the host State. Investment treaties typically contain
detailed definitions of who qualifies as an "investor" and what
constitutes a protected "investment." They normally provide for equal
treatment of domestic and foreign investors (the so-called "national
treatment" and "most-favoured-nation treatment" clauses), a minimum
standard of treatment to investors (the obligation for the host State to
provide a "fair and equitable treatment"), compensation in case of
expropriation of an investment by the host State and dispute-resolution
by international arbitration. Of particular importance is the ability for
foreign investors to resolve investment disputes by bringing claims
directly against the States in which they invest. ' 2 This aspect has rightly
been described as "one of the most important progressive developments
in the procedure of international law of the 20th century." 
13
As a result of these developments, the number of arbitration cases
between investors and States is booming. There are currently some 290
known investor-State arbitration cases pending.14 In the last five years,
an average of 40 new cases have been filed each year.'5 These are
dramatic figures considering that, in the first 30 years of the existence of
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
("ICSID"), only one to two cases were registered each year.16
11. Protection is also often found in contracts entered into directly between foreign
investors and States (or State-owned entities) or in the legislation of the host State of the
investment.
12. Under these treaties, no longer is a foreign investor required to go before local
courts or to have its claim "espoused" by its State of origin. Generally, however, an
investor must opt between international arbitration or other venues under so-called "fork-
in-the-road" provisions.
13. Schwebel, supra note 2, 2. It can be argued that as a result of these changes,
corporations can be deemed as "subjects" of international law in the context of investor-
State arbitration arising from BITs, see: Patrick Dumberry, L 'entreprise, sujet de droit
international? Retour sur la question 6 la lumi~re des d~veloppements r~cents du droit
international des investissements, 108(1) RGDIP 103-122 (2004).
14. UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 1 IIA
MONITOR 1 (2008). It should be noted that there are also a number of investor-State
disputes currently being settled by arbitration about which information is not publicly
available (for instance, those arbitrations under the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Arbitration Rules.
15. Id., p. 1.
16. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1975, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 160 [hereinafter
ICSID Convention].
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III. A REBUTTAL TO THE PROPOSITION THAT BITS REPRESENT THE
"NEW" CUSTOM
Despite the early lack of consensus, it is undeniable that some
principles of customary international law have emerged in the last
decades in the field of international investment law. For instance, the
obligation for the host State to provide foreign investors with the
"minimum standard of treatment" is a custom norm. 17 Similarly, the
host State cannot expropriate a foreign investor's investment unless four
conditions are met: the taking must be for a public purpose, as provided
by law, conducted in a non-discriminatory manner and with
compensation in return. 
18
As a direct result of the emergence of these numerous BITs, the
question arises as to the role and relevance of custom in contemporary
international investment law. As explained by Schreuer and Dolzer, by
the 1990s "the tide had turned" and capital-importing states were no
longer opposed to the application of custom, but instead granted through
BITs "more protection to foreign investment than traditional customary
law did, now on the basis of treaties negotiated to attract additional
foreign investment."' 9 The controversial issue currently being debated in
academia and amongst arbitrators deals with the impact that BITs have
on the existence and the content of custom. 20 More specifically, do BITs
represent the "new" custom in this field?
17. Mondev International Ltd. v. United States, Award, 121 (Oct. 11, 2002)
(ICSID). See also L. REED, J. PAULSSON & N. BLACKABY, A GUIDE To ICSID
ARBITRATION 48 (2004); I. TUDOR, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD IN
INTERNATIONAL FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW, 61-62 (2006); OECD, Fair and Equitable
Treatment Standard in International Investment Law, 8 (2004).
18. Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, Award, 11.3 (Sept. 16, 2003) (ICSID)
("[i]t is plain that several of the BIT standards, and the prohibition against expropriation
in particular, are simply a conventional codification of standards that have long existed in
customary international law"). See also OECD, "Indirect Expropriation'" and The
"Right To Regulate" in International Investment Law, 3 (2004); C. MACLACHLAN, L.
SHORE & M. WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE
PRINCIPLES, 16 (2007).
19. C. SCHREUER & R. DOLZER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 16
(2008). The reasons why developing States adopted BITs en masse is explained in
Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38(4) VIRG JIL 639-688 (1998).
20. In doctrine: Stephen M. Schwebel, Investor-State Disputes and the Development
of International Law: the Influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Customary
International Law, 98 ASiL PROC. 27-30 (2004); Steffen Hindelang, Bilateral Investment
Treaties, Custom and a Healthy Investment Climate: the Question of Whether BITs
Influence Customary International Law Revisited, 5 Jwi & T 789-809 (2004); Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and International Law, 42 COL JLT 123-130 (2003);
Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation of
Customary International Law, 14(2) NJILB 327-375; Guzman, supra note 19; Abdullah
Al Faruque, Creating Customary International Law Through Bilateral Investment
[Vol. 28:4
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The position of Judge Schwebel, former president of the ICJ and a
leading arbitrator in investor-State disputes, is a good starting point to
examine the issue. He believes that "customary international law
governing the treatment of foreign investment has been reshaped to
embody the principles of law found in more than two thousand
concordant bilateral investment treaties., 21 The CME Tribunal (in which
Schwebel acted as an artibrator) reached the same conclusion that BITs
had "reshaped the body of customary international law."22 Similarly, the
Mondev Tribunal also held that the "content" of "current international
law" was "shaped by the conclusion of more than two thousand bilateral
investment treaties and many treaties of friendship and commerce."23
There is no doubt that the content of contemporary custom is
"shaped" (or "reshaped") by these numerous BITs.24 However, while it
is certainly true that BITs will influence the development of customary
international law, it is quite another thing to simply say that BITs now
represent the new custom in international investment law. Yet, this is the
position adopted by some writers. For instance, Laird endorses the view
that "we have reached that point in the development of international
investment law where we must seriously consider these instruments [i.e.,
BITs] as reflective of the development of new customary international
law.",25 What is that so-called "new" custom? Apparently, it simply
consists of the more than 2,000 BITs entered into by States. This is the
position of Schwebel for whom, "when BITs prescribe treating the
foreign investor in accordance with customary international law, they
should be understood to mean the standard of international law embodied
Treaties: A Critical Appraisal, 44 INDIAN J INT L 292 (2004); T. Gazzini, The Role of
Customary International Law in the Protection of Foreign Investment, 8(5) JWi & T 691
(2007); C. McLachlan, Investment Treaties and General International Law, 57(2) ICLQ
361-401 (2008); Cai Congyan, International Investment Treaties and the Formation,
Application and Transformation of Customary International Law Rules, 7(3) CHINESE J.
INT'L L., 659- 679 (1998).
21. Schwebel, supra note 20, at 27 (emphasis added).
22. CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, award, 498 (Mar. 14, 2003)
(UNCITRAL).
23. Mondev, supra note 17, 125 (emphasis added). The Tribunal was interpreting
NAFTA Article 1105.
24. See Gazzini, supra note 20, at 703.
25. Ian A. Laird, A Community of Destiny-The Barcelona Traction Case and the
Development of Shareholder Rights to Bring Investment Claims, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFrA,
BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 95-96 (T. Weiler, ed. 2005)
(emphasis added) (see also "A strong argument can now be made that sufficient
constancy does exist in investment instruments and related jurisprudence, and that this
particular area of international law has evolved to reflect a new and consistent state of
international custom.").
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in the terms of some two thousand concordant BITs."26 This seems also
to be the position of Lowenfeld: "taken together, the [BITs] are now
evidence of customary international law, applicable even when a given
situation or controversy is not explicitly governed by a treaty.', 27 In
other words, for these writers the content of custom is now simply the
same as that of BITs.
This paper argues, for the reasons set out below, that the better view
is that custom in the field of international investment law does not
correspond to the total sum of 2,500 BITs. We will first examine a few
basic arguments against the proposition equalling custom and BITs (A)
and then analyse its main weakness, i.e., that it does not meet the
definition of customary international law (B).
A. A Few Basic Arguments against the Proposition Equalling Custom
and BITs
1. The Quantity of BITs is not Relevant
The quest to identify customary rules of international investment
law is undoubtedly a complicated exercise. As explained by the Mondev
Tribunal, "[i]t is often difficult in international practice to establish at
what point obligations accepted in treaties, multilateral or bilateral, come
to condition the content of a rule of customary international law binding
on States not party to those treaties."2 8 What is clear, however, is that
the identification of custom rules cannot simply be a "mechanical
exercise based on mere quantitative consideration., 29 Thus, not much
can be deduced from the existence of numerous treaties on one subject
matter. Clearly, no conclusion can be reached on the existence of any
customary rule by simply adding up the number of treaties. 30  As
explained by one writer, "the mere prevalence of similarly worded treaty
language, however numerous, will not, without more, give rise to a
binding obligation in custom. ' 31 The ADF Tribunal reached the same
conclusion:
We are not convinced that the Investor has shown the existence, in
current customary international law, of a general and autonomous
26. Schwebel, supra note 20, at 29-30.
27. ANDREAs F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL EcONOMic LAW 584 (2nd ed. 2008)
(emphasis added); Lowenfeld, supra note 20, at 123-130. See also F.A. Mann, British
Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 52 BRITIsH YIL 249 (1981).
28. Mondev, supra note 17, I 11.
29. Gazzini, supra note 20, 704.
30. Al Faruque, supra note 20, at 300-301.
31. McLachlan, supra note 20, 400.
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requirement (autonomous, that is, from specific rules addressing
particular, limited, contexts) to accord fair and equitable treatment
and full protection and security to foreign investments. The Investor,
for instance, has not shown that such a requirement has been brought
into the corpus of present day customary international law by the
many hundreds of bilateral investment treaties now extant.
32
2. BITs Cannot be Assessed as a Whole
Another troubling aspect of the proposition is that it is based on the
assumption that these BITs can somehow be analysed as a whole.
Clearly, the mass of BITs simply cannot be assessed globally as a single
species. This is because these treaties greatly vary in form. The 10-
pages older BIT entered into by Canada with Poland and Hungary in
1990-1991 simply cannot be compared to the much more comprehensive
104-pages BIT Canada concluded 15 years later with Peru.33 Similarly,
recent BITs entered into by Germany cannot be compared with earlier
ones providing only for State-to-State dispute resolution mechanism
(such as the BIT entered into with Malaysia in 1960) 34. Moreover,
modem BITs also greatly vary in content (a point examined below).
Logically, only specific substantive obligations (such as, for instance, the
obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment) can be subject to an
enquiry as to whether or not they have crystallised into a customary rule.
This exercise simply cannot be undertaken in abstracto with respect to
thousands of treaties in toto.
3. The Proposition is Circular
As mentioned above, for Schwebel when a BIT "prescribe[s]
treating the foreign investor in accordance with customary international
law" what this really means is "the standard of international law
embodied in the terms of some two thousand concordant BITs."35 There
is something oddly circular about the proposition. Thus, in order to find
out the exact meaning of a customary rule as referred to in a BIT, one
should simply look at the all BITs. Under this interpretation, one cannot
32. ADF Group Inc. v. United States, Award 183 (Jan. 9, 2003) (ICSID) (emphasis
added).
33. Patrick Dumberry & Stephen L. Drymer, Canada's Accession to the ICSID
Convention and the 2006 Canada-Peru Bilateral Investment Treaty: New Protections and
Opportunities for Investors, in EL ARBITRAJE EN EL PERO Y EL MUNDO (C.A. Soto
Coaguila ed. 2008).
34. Agreement Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Federation of
Malaya Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed on
22 December 1960, entered into force on 06 July 1963, BGBI 11 1962, 1064.
35. Schwebel, supra note 20, at 29-30.
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help but wonder why BITs should refer to custom at all? In any event,
such an across-the-board renvoi to thousands of treaties is not
particularly helpful to practitioners and judges having to actually
determine the content of custom.
B. BITs are Missing the Two Necessary Elements of Custom
The main weakness of the proposition equalling BITs to any such
"new" custom is its basic failure to meet the definition of customary
international law. Custom has two constitutive elements: a "constant
and uniform" (but not necessarily unanimous) practice of States in their
international relations and the belief that such practice is required by law
(opiniojuris).36
This double requirement is one of the most well-established
principles of international law. It has been recognized as such by several
ICJ decisions.37 For instance, in the Continental Shelf case, the Court
stated that "[i]t is of course axiomatic that the material of customary
international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and
opiniojuris of States.",38 The double requirement of custom also applies
in the context of investor-State arbitration. For instance, the UPS
Tribunal stated that "to establish a rule of customary international law,
two requirements must be met: consistent state practice and an
understanding that the practice is required by law.",39  It is also
noteworthy that this double requirement is expressly referred to in recent
BITs entered into by the United States (based on the US Model BIT) 40 as
well as some other agreements entered into by Australia.4'
36. International Law Association (ILA), Statement of Principles Applicable to the
Formation of General Customary International Law, Final Report, 8 (2000).
37. Lotus Case (France v. Turkey) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 18, 28; Asylum
Case (Colombia v. Peru), 1950, I.C.J., 265, at 276-7 (June 13); Right of Passage Case
(Portugal v. India), 1960, I.C.J. at 42-43 (Apr. 12); North Sea Continental Shelf Case (FR
Germany v. Denmark), 1969 I.C.J., at 44 (Feb. 20).
38. Continental Shelf Case (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J., 13 at 27 (June 3).
39. United Parcel Service v. Canada, Dec. Jurisdiction, 84 (Nov. 22, 2002)
(UNCITRAL).
40. See, for instance, the U.S.-Uruguay BIT (2005) and the U.S.-Rwanda BIT
(2008). Annexe A to the U.S. Model BIT expressly mentions that "The Parties confirm
their shared understanding that 'customary international law, generally and as specifically
referenced in Article 5 [Minimum Standard of Treatment] and Annex B [Expropriation]
results from a general and consistent practice of States that they follow from a sense of
legal obligation."
41. Chile-Australia Free Trade Agreement ("FTA") (at Annex 10-A); U.S.-Australia
FTA (at Annex 1 -A).
[Vol. 28:4
BITS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
I. There is no Consistent State Practice
According to Akehurst, "state practice covers any act or statement
by a state from which views about customary law may be inferred. 42
International treaties are undoubtedly an example of State practice. 43 It
has also long been recognised by the ICJ that nothing prevents (under
certain specific circumstances) a treaty rule from developing into a
customary international law rule. 4 This principle is in fact embodied in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.45 In theory, BITs can
therefore serve as evidence of the element of State practice required to
establish the existence of a rule of customary international law.46 This is,
for instance, the conclusion reached by the Tribunal in the case of
Camuzzi v. Argentina which refuted the claim that "lex specialis cannot
be considered as leading to a rule of customary law" and held that "there
is no obstacle in international law to the expression of the will of States
through treaties being at the same time an expression of practice and of
the opinio juris necessary for the birth of a customary rule if the
conditions for it are met."
47
At the same time, the recent work of the International Law
Association (ILA) on customary international law shows that "[t]here is
no presumption that a succession of similar treaty provisions gives rise to
a new customary rule with the same content.",48 Interestingly, the work
42. M. Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRITISH YIL 10
(1974-75).
43. ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 104
(1971) ("[A] treaty arguably is a clear record of a binding international commitment that
constitutes the 'practice of states' and hence is as much a record of customary behavior as
any other state act or restraint."). See also I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (6th ed. 2003); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, THIRD, THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102, comment I (1987).
44. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 37, at 71, explains the
phenomenon as follows: ".... a norm-creating provision which has constituted the
foundation of, or has generated a rule which, while only conventional or contractual in its
origin, has since passed into the general corpus of international law, and is now accepted
as such by the opiniojuris, so as to have become binding even for countries which have
never, and do not, become parties to the Convention. There is no doubt that this process
is a perfectly possible one and does from time to time occur: it constitutes indeed one of
the recognized methods by which new rules of customary international law may be
formed. At the same time this result is not lightly to be regarded as having been
attained."
45. Art. 38, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 UNTS
331.
46. Hindelang, supra note 20, 793-795. For Gazzini, supra note 20, 701, what is
required for BITs to generate customs is a "remarkably high number of similar treaties
[that] have been concluded among a largely representative number of States."
47. Camuzzi International S.A. v. Argentina, Dec. Jurisdiction 144 (May 11, 2005)
(ICSID).
48. Principle no. 25 adopted by the ILA, supra note 36, at 47 (emphasis added).
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of the ILA specifically addressed the question of the impact of BITs on
custom and concluded as follows:
The question of the legal effect of a succession of similar treaties or
treaty provisions arises particularly in relation to bilateral treaties,
such as those dealing with extradition or investment protection....
[T]here seems to be no reason of principle why these agreements,
however numerous, should be presumed to give rise to new rules of
customary law or to constitute the State practice necessary for their
emergence.... Some have argued that provisions of bilateral
investment protection treaties (especially the arrangements about
compensation or damages for expropriation) are declaratory of, or
have come to constitute, customary law. But ... there seems to be no
special reason to assume that this is the case, unless it can be shown
that these provisions demonstrate a widespread acceptance of the
rules set out in these treaties outside the treaty framework.
49
The first basic requirement of custom remains proof of consistent
State practice. This is particularly true in the context of BITs where
rapidly increasing State practice is a rather recent phenomenon which
accelerated only in the 1990s. As explained by the ICJ in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Case, State practice must be "both extensive and
virtually uniform" where it is asserted that a rule of customary
international law has emerged in a short period of time.5° The
undeniable reality is that BITs are very diverse in their content and
scope. Taken together, these treaties are certainly not consistent enough
to constitute the basis for any rule of customary international law.
Indeed, this is the general position adopted by Canada in NAFTA
arbitration proceedings:
Even amongst the BITs, no consistent practice can be found. The
variation of terms, and specifically the differences in the scope and
nature of access to international arbitration makes it impossible to
find a consistent practice. Without such a consistent practice there
can be no customary norm.51
This is also the position held by many authors in doctrine who have
undertaken the analysis of BITs to determine whether specific
substantive rights contained in these treaties represent custom. 52 Those
49. Id., at 47-48 (emphasis in the original).
50. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 37, at 75.
51. "Canada's Article 1128 Submission on Jurisdiction Concerning Loewen
Corporate Restructuring" 118 (June 27, 2002), submitted in the context of the case of
Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States (ICSID).
52. M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 206 (2nd
ed. 2004) ("there is so much divergence in the standards in the [BITs] that it is premature
to conclude that they give rise to any significant rule of international law"); Kishoiyian,
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studies concluded that there is no consistent State practice on the
following issues: the definition of investment,53 the control of the entry
of investment by the host State in its territory, 54 national treatment and
the most favoured national treatment,55 the standard of compensation as
a result of measures of expropriation,5 6 the criteria to determine the value
of expropriated property,57 and the repatriation of profits.58 Another area
where a lack of consistency of State practice has been observed by
scholars concerns dispute settlement mechanisms and, in particular, the
issues of amicable negotiations, the applicable procedural rules to the
conduct of arbitration, the applicable law governing the dispute, and the
exhaustion of local remedies before resorting to arbitration.59
In the context of the present paper, it will suffice to provide a single
illustration of the lack of consistency of BITs in one area: corporations'
and shareholders' protection.6 °
2. One Illustration: The Protection Offered to Corporations and
Shareholders under BITs
As mentioned above, modern investment treaties typically define
the term "investment" very broadly to encompass shares in corporations.
The term "investor" is also usually defined in broad terms. There
remain, however, some important inconsistencies between BITs with
respect to how they specifically define "investor" and the nationality of
corporations. 61 This is important because nationality is the gateway to
supra note 20, 372-373 ("a close analysis of the various BITs (... ) has revealed that there
not sufficient consistency in the terms of the investment treaties to find in them support
for any definite principles of customary international law"). See also: M. Mendelson, The
Runaway Train: the Continuous Nationality Rule from the Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway
Case to Loewen, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING
CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW 141 (T. Weiler, ed. 2005); McLachlan, supra note 20, 393; Cai, supra note 20, 13.
53. Sornarajah, Id., 220-227.
54. Kishoiyian, supra note 20, 343-346.
55. Al Faruque, supra note 20, 304-305.
56. Id., 305-306; Somarajah, supra note 52, 436, 441-443; Kishoiyian, supra note
20, 356-363. See also: M. Khalil, Treatment of Foreign Investment in Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 7 ICSID REV. 352 (1992).
57. Al Faruque, supra note 20, 306.
58. Id., at 306; Kishoiyian, supra note 20, 353-354.
59. Al Faruque, supra note 20, 307-310; Somarajah, supra note 52, 250; Kishoiyian,
supra note 20, 363-372.
60. See, Patrick Dumberry, The Legal Standing of Shareholders before Arbitral
Tribunals: Has Any Rule Of Customary International Law Crystallised?, 18(3)
MICHIGAN STATE JIL, 2010 (forthcoming)
61. Gazzini, supra note 20, 709. See also R. Dolzer & M. Stevens, supra note 61, at
34 ff.; Kishoiyian, supra note 20, at 346-353.
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legal protection under an investment treaty.62 The scope of the definition
of what is considered an "investor" under a BIT determines if a
corporation and its shareholders receive any protection under that
treaty.63 In other words, the legal standing of a corporation or a
shareholder and its access to arbitration always depends on whether or
not it fits into the definition of "investor" under a specific treaty.
A recent study of BITs entered into by countries of the Americas
highlights the great inconsistency in the definitions of corporate
nationality. 64 Out of 40 BITs examined, the author found no less than
five different definitions of "investor": five treaties defined nationality
of a corporation solely based on incorporation, 15 required incorporation
plus the seat of management, nine required incorporation, seat of
management and effective economic activities, 10 allowed claims based
on incorporation plus the seat of management or economic activities, and
finally, only one treaty required incorporation and control.65 In other
words, what is an "investor" under these BITs really depends on the
exact wording of each treaty. Clearly, no general standard exists in the
Americas.
The same is also true for the rest of the world. Some treaties require
that a corporation be not only incorporated in a State party, but that its
effective management (such as its headquarters) also be located there.66
Other treaties further require that the corporation be controlled by
nationals of the State of incorporation or have substantial business
activities in that State. 67 At the other extreme, some BITs entered into
by the Netherlands extend protection to legal entities not even
incorporated in that country provided that they are controlled by Dutch
62. Anthony C. Sinclair, The Substance of Nationality Requirements in Investment
Treaty Arbitration 20(2) ICSID REv.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 357 (2005); Pia Acconci,
Determining the Internationally Relevant Link between a State and a Corporate Investor,
Recent Trends concerning the Application of the 'Genuine Link' Test, 5 JwT & 1139-175
(2004).
63. S.W. Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law: The
Emergence of a Multilateral System of Investment Protection on the Basis of Bilateral
Treaties (June 26, 2008). Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) Inaugural
Conference Paper, 2008; SIEL Online Proceedings Working Paper No. 18/08, at p. 14-
15, available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract=1 151817.
64. Lawrence Jahoon Lee, Barcelona Traction in the 21st Century: Revisiting Its
Customary and Policy Underpinnings 35 Years Later, 42 STAN. J. INT'L L. 237-289
(2006) 272-273.
65. Id.
66. Several examples are discussed in Sinclair, supra note 62, at 374 ff. He refers
specifically to the U.K.-Philippines BIT (1981) and the Italy-Libya BIT.
67. For instance, the United States Model BIT (2004); Canadian Model Foreign
Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement (FIPA) (2004) [hereinafter Canada
Model BIT].
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nationals. 68 These are clear examples of State practice not consistent
enough to form the basis of any customary rule.
In fact, completely different approaches are sometimes adopted by
the same country depending on the treaty. A good illustration is
Canada's position concerning special-purpose "holding" of "shell"
corporations. Most BITs entered into by Canada provide that a
corporation is considered "Canadian" under the treaty if it is
"incorporated or duly constituted in accordance with applicable laws of
Canada., 69  A holding corporation incorporated in Canada would
therefore be covered under these treaties. However, other BITs require
that a corporation also be "controlled" (either directly or indirectly) by
Canadian nationals. 70 The same requirement is found in the Model BIT
adopted by Canada, which requires that a corporation have "substantial
business activities" in Canada to be considered Canadian. 71 So-called
"shell" corporations incorporated in Canada that do not meet these
requirements are therefore not protected under these treaties. Other
inconsistencies also exist in BITs entered into by Canada concerning
protection to "indirect" shareholders. 
72
In sum, the scope and extent of protection offered under BITs to
corporations and shareholders greatly varies. Indeed, there is no general
standard on the legal standing of corporation and their access to
international arbitration. The existence of this procedural right
ultimately depends on the exact wording of each treaty. No standardised
solution exists in BITs. The variegated State practice is certainly not
consistent enough to constitute the basis for any rule of custom. 73  It
certainly does not fulfil the requirement as recently set out by the ILA
68. For instance, the Netherlands-Bulgaria BIT, discussed in Sinclair, supra note 62,
368.
69. See, for instance, the BIT entered into by Canada with Ecuador Hungary (1997).
70. See, for instance, the BITs entered into by Canada with Hungary (1993) and
Costa Rica (1999).
71. Art. 18. The same rule is found in NAFTA at Art. 1113(2) and in the recent
Canada-Peru BIT at Art. 18.
72. Most of Canada's BITs define "investment" as any kind of asset invested by a
Canadian company in the territory of the other party "either directly, or indirectly through
an investor of a third State" (emphasis added). However, an earlier BIT entered into with
Poland in 1990 does not make explicit reference to "indirect" investments. Also,
although the Canada-Hungary BIT does refer to "indirect participation," it does not
explicitly refer to the possibility of such participation being made through a company
incorporated in a third State. The issue of indirect claims is discussed in Markus
Perkams, Piercing the Corporate Veil in International Investment Agreements: the Issue
of Indirect Shareholder Claims Reloaded, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW IN
CONTEXT 93-114 (A. Reinish & C. Knahr, eds., 2008).
73. Somarajah, supra note 52, 232; Kishoiyian, supra note 20, 352; Gazzini, supra
note 20, 707-7 10.
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whereby "[f]or State practice to create a rule of customary law, it must be
virtually uniform. 74
3. BITs Lack any Opinio Juris
As explained by the ICJ in North Sea Continental Shelf, "[n]ot only
must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also
be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that
this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it."' 75 As explained by Schachter, "the repetition of common
clauses in bilateral treaties does not create or support an inference that
those clauses express customary law" because "[t]o sustain such a claim
of custom one would have to show that apart from the treaty itself, the
rules in the clauses are considered obligatory."
' 76
The requirement of the element of opinio juris has been repeatedly
reiterated by arbitral tribunals deciding investor-State disputes.77 States
taking part in arbitration proceedings have also adopted the same
position. The Mondev Tribunal explains that all three NAFTA parties
rejected in no uncertain terms the Pope Tribunal's reasoning equating
custom with BITs without even mentioning the opiniojuris requirement:
In their post-hearing submissions, all three NAFTA Parties
challenged holdings of the Tribunal in Pope & Talbot which find that
the content of contemporary international law reflects the concordant
provisions of many hundreds of bilateral investment treaties. In
particular, attention was drawn to what those three States saw as a
failure of the Pope & Talbot Tribunal to consider a necessary element
of the establishment of a rule of customary international law, namely
opinio juris. These States appear to question whether the parties to
the very large numbers of bilateral investment treaties have acted out
of a sense of legal obligation when they include provisions in those
treaties such as that for "fair and equitable" treatment of foreign
investment. 
78
74. ILA, supra note 36, at 21 (Principle no. 13).
75. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 37, 1 77.
76. Oscar Schachter, Compensation for Expropriation, 78 AsIL 126 (1984)
(emphasis added). See also McLachlan, supra note 20, 393, 400.
77. UPS, supra note 39, 84.
78. Mondev, supra note 17, 110. The Tribunal also referred to the U.S. position
that Tribunal in Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, Award Damages (May 31, 2002)
(UNCITRAL), had "erred in its automatic equation of customary international law with
the content of BITs, without regard to any question of opinio juris" ( 106). In the
context of the Loewen case, supra note 51, Mexico made the following observation: "The
[Pope] Tribunal did not refer to the essential additional requirement of opinio juris. In
Mexico's respectful view, the Pope & Talbot Tribunal's failure to observe basic
principles of treaty interpretation and its treatment of proving the existence of a
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There is certainly no evidence of any opinio juris by States entering
into BITs.7 9 As the UPS Tribunal stated "[w]hile BITs are large in
number, their coverage is limited ... and in terms of opiniojuris there is
no indication that they reflect a general sense of obligation." 80 In fact,
the evidence suggests that the decision of States to enter into BITs is
solely based on their (perceived) economic interest.
Thus, Guzman explains that developing States that have long
rejected the so-called Hull formula on compensation for expropriation
have nevertheless signed hundreds of BITs containing provisions similar
to the formula (and which, at any rate, offer greater legal protection to
foreign investors than under custom). 8 1 For him, these States sign BITs
to have "an advantage in the competition for foreign investment." 82 A
similar conclusion was reached in a recent study which explains "the
diffusion of BITs" based on the "competitive economic pressures among
developing countries to capture a share of foreign investment."
' 83
Clearly, developing states sign BITs to attract foreign investments.
As explained by one writer, "a BIT between a developed and a
developing country is founded on a grand bargain: a promise of
protection of capital in return for the prospect of more capital in the
future.",84 Guzman convincingly concludes that it is "simply not possible
to explain the paradoxical behaviour of [less developed countries] toward
foreign investment based on a view that BITs reflect opinio juris" as
these BITs "do not reflect a sense of legal obligation but are rather the
customary international law rule does not commend its Awards to this Tribunal. Its
Awards have been wrongly decided and should be disregarded." ("Mexico's Article
1128 Submission Concerning Loewen Corporate Restructuring" 39-40 (July 2, 2002)).
See also Canada's position in the same Loewen case: "the Pope & Talbot Tribunal
referred to no opiniojuris surrounding these agreements and appeared unaware that such
a sense of legal obligation is required before a customary norm can be found. The Pope
& Talbot Tribunal failed to establish the fundamental pre-conditions to the creation of
customary obligations had been met. Therefore, Canada submits that the Pope and
Talbot Tribunal's conclusions with respect to the status of BITs as crystallizations of
customary law should not be followed." (Canada's Submission, supra note 51, 25-26).
79. Al Faruque, supra note 20, 310; McLachlan, supra note 20, 393; Cai, supra note
20, 14.
80. UPS, supra note 39, 97. The same Tribunal also added that that "the failure of
efforts to establish a multilateral agreement on investment provides further evidence of
that lack of a sense of obligation."
81. Guzman, supra note 20, at 640.
82. Id., at 687.
83. Z. Elkins, A.T. Guzman & B.A. Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion
of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 60(4) INT. ORG. 811-846 (2006).
84. J.W. Salacuse, The Treatification of International Investment Law: a Victory of
Form Over Life? A Crossroads Crossed? 3(3) TRANSNAT'L DisP. MGMT. 7 (2006)
(emphasis in the original). See also J.W. Salacuse & N.P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really
Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46
HARVARD ILJ 67 (2005).
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result of countries using the international tools at their disposal to pursue
their economic interests., 85  The contrary position of Hindelang, who
affirms the existence of an opinio juris solely based on the "common
interests of States," has clearly no foundation at international law. 86 It
should be noted that other writers have also argued that the uneven
bargaining strength of the parties negotiating a BIT show the lack of any
opinio juris by developing States 87 and that BITs often serve political
and ideological purposes for some developed States, such as, for
instance, the promotion of capitalism, liberalism and democracy.
88
Ultimately, BITs are the result of trade-offs and mutual concessions
between States. Their content depends on the political and economic
bargaining power of each party to the negotiations. 89 BITs are the result
of a compromise between conflicting interests; they are not entered into
by States based on any perceived legal obligation.
C. States Reject the Proposition that BITs Represent Custom
As explained by the Glamis Gold Tribunal, statements made by
States in arbitration proceedings can represent State practice. 90  The
85. Guzman, supra note 20, 687.
86. Hindelang, supra note 20, at 806: "the states have left us today with a network of
more than 2,300 BITs-a broad statement that almost the whole community of States
views foreign investment favourably and its protection by international law not only
desirable but necessary. Can this, however, also be viewed as a statement in favour of
common principles embodies in customary international law? The answer is almost
certainly yes." See also at 808: "[t]here is a real 'interest of States' in a set of basic
principles on foreign investment in customary international law. Sovereignty must step
back. Due to the fact that it is not possible to see any convincing 'interest' in the
preservation of sovereignty, but a real interest in a set of basic principles on foreign
investment embodies in custom, opiniojuris can be derived in the case of BITs."
87. Al Faruque, supra note 20, at 310, 315, arguing that the "unequal bargaining
strength especially manifested in BITs between developed and developing countries,
diminishes the developing country's autonomy to give consent to BIT considerably."
88. Id., at 315. He refers to the BIT program of the United States in Eastern Europe
and ex-USSR. He also indicates that "developing countries sometimes use BIT free to
pursue a variety of economic nationalist and populist policies prompted by special
political consideration." See also Cai, supra note 20, 14: "the appropriate justification
to deny the existence of opinio juris from some developing countries in BIT is that in
many cases these countries conclude BITs either as the result of undue pressure from
developed countries or as a result of their aspiration for international legitimacy during
economic or political transformation" (he adds, however, at 20, that this argument is no
longer valid when a developing states becomes capital exporting).
89. OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 303 (1991).
See also Kishoiyian, supra note 20, at 333.
90. Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award 602 (June 8, 2009) (UNCITRAL):
"The evidence of such 'concordant practice' undertaken out of a sense of legal obligation
is exhibited in very few authoritative sources: treaty ratification language, statements of
governments, treaty practice (e.g., Model BITs), and sometimes pleadings." The
Tribunal added that "in the NAFTA context, there is the addition of Article 1128
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proposition that customary law is coterminous with BITs has been
explicitly rejected by States.91 This is clearly the case in the context of
NAFTA arbitration. 92 For instance, in the context of the Loewen case,
Mexico (a third party to the proceedings) made the following comments:
Mexico is particularly concerned about the suggestion that the fact
that the mere existence of some 1800 BITs in the world means that
[sic] somehow that the corpus of these treaties creates customary
international law obligations. The fact that States may agree to the
same or similar obligations through different treaties involving
different parties, or even the same obligations through multilateral
treaties is not sufficient on its own to build customary international
law.
93
[i]t is impossible to infer from the existence of a large number of
BITs alone that any particular provision therein represents a rule of
customary international law merely by reason of its commonality.
94
The same position was also adopted by the United States and by Canada,
in the Loewen case, 95 the Glamis case, 96 and the more recent Chemtura
case. 97
IV. BITS CONTRIBUTE TO THE CONSOLIDATION AND THE
CRYSTALLISATION OF CUSTOMARY RULES
The previous section has shown that BITs do not represent any
"new" customary international law. In other words, the content of
custom and the thousands of BITs are simply not the same. This is,
indeed, the prevailing view in doctrine. 98 The logical conclusion must
submissions through which the State Parties can express directly their views on and
interpretations of the provisions of the NAFTA."
91. As just mentioned, this opposition by all three NAFTA States is clearly
explained by the Tribunal in Mondev, supra note 17, at 110.
92. NB: In 2008-2009, the present author worked for the Trade Law Bureau at
Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and was personally
involved as counsel for Canada in NAFTA Chapter 11 cases.
93. Mexico's Submission, supra note 78, 33, in the Loewen case, supra note 51.
94. Id., 39.
95. "U.S. Response to Canada and Mexico's Article 1128 Submissions" at 3 (July
19, 2002) ("no rule of customary international law relevant to this NAFTA proceeding is
established by the various bilateral investment agreements between States not parties to
the NAFTA").
96. "United States' Rejoinder Memorial" at 142 ff. (Mar 15, 2007) in the context of
Glamis Gold, supra note 90.
97. "Canada's Counter-Memorial" 269-273 (Oct. 20, 2008). in Chemtura
Corporation v. Canada, (UNCITRAL).
98. Al Faruque, supra note 20, 293; Guzman, supra note 20, 684-685; Sornarajah,
supra note 52, 158-159, 206, 213.
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therefore be that BITs only create lex specialis rules solely applicable
between the countries which are party to these BITs.99 In the recent
ADM case, the Tribunal stated that the substantive obligations contained
in a multilateral investment treaty (Section A of NAFTA Chapter 11)
"offers a form of lex specialis to supplement the under-developed
standards of customary international law relating to the treatment of
aliens and property." 100 Yet, this answer is not entirely satisfactory as it
wrongly excludes the role that these treaties might play in the
development of custom.
In doctrine, some writers now speak of the emergence of a
"common law of investment protection, with a substantially shared
understanding of its general tenets."' 01  For them, "the very iterative
process of the formulation and conclusion of investment treaties, and the
vindication of the rights contained in these treaties in arbitration, is
producing a set of general international principles about the meaning of
the common substantive clauses, and indeed the larger operation of the
system of investment arbitration."'1 2 This "common law of investment
protection" is, of course, not the same as custom per se. But at the same
time, it is also not entirely detached from the phenomenon of customary
international law. As explained by Mondev Tribunal, "such a body of
concordant practice [i.e. BITs] will necessarily have influenced the
content of rules governing the treatment of foreign investment in current
international law."'
10 3
In the present author's view, there is undoubtedly a certain
convergence or "cross-fertilisation" between this emerging body of law
and customary international law.' 04 In other words, it seems obvious that
these numerous BITs will influence customary international law. This
observation can, however, only be the starting point of the analysis.
Thus, for Gazzini, "the crux of the matter is to understand the
consequences of such an influence in terms of creation and development
of customary international law." 105 This paper argues that the impact of
BITs on customary international law is twofold.
99. Somarajah, supra note 52, 158-159, 206; Kishoiyian, supra note 20, 329; B.
Legum, Dallas Workshop 2001: Commentary Scene III: ICSID Proceedings in the
Absence of a Bilateral Investment Treaty 18(3) ARB. INT. 306; Al Faruque, supra note 20,
316.
100. Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v.
Mexico, Award 117 (Nov. 21, 2007) (ICSID).
101. McLachlan, supra note 18, 18-21. Contra: M.C. Porterfield, An International
Common Law ofInvestor Rights?, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 79 (2006).
102. McLachlan, supra note 18, 20.
103. Mondev, supra note 17, 117.
104. McLachlan, supra note 18, 394-395.
105. Gazzini, supra note 20, 703.
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First, some of the standards of protection systematically contained
in BITs will certainly contribute to the consolidation of already existing
rules of custom in international investment law. 10 6  This process is
known in international law as "codification" whereby a certain treaty
provision codifies an existing rule of custom. 10 7  In the Generation
Ukraine case, the Tribunal noted that "[i]t is plain that several of the BIT
standards, and the prohibition against expropriation in particular, are
simply a conventional codification of standards that have long existed in
customary international law."' 1 8 Another example of codification is the
recent case of OEPC v. Ecuador where the Tribunal came to the
conclusion that the content of the obligation to provide fair and equitable
treatment to investors under the US-Ecuador BIT was the same as that
required under customary international law.' 09
In that context, the content of both custom and a treaty provision is
identical and both can continue to exist in parallel. It has long been
recognized by the ICJ that a rule of customary international law can
indeed co-exist at the same time in parallel to a treaty rule." 0 In the
future, it may be that a custom rule will further develop and, therefore,
have a content that is different from the treaty provision. In the event of
a conflict as to the content of the rule, "there is general authority for the
view that a BIT can be considered as a lex specialis whose provisions
will prevail over rules of customary international law.""'
Second, the "common law of investment protection" resulting from
BITs will also contribute to the crystallisation of new rules of customary
106. Id., 703, 714.
107. R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 REC. COURS 82 (1970-71).
108. Generation Ukraine, supra note 18, T 11.3.
109. Occidental Petroleum Corp. & Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v.
Ecuador, (ICSID) Award 1 189, 190 (July 1, 2004): "The issue that arises is whether the
fair and equitable treatment mandated by the Treaty is a more demanding standard that
that prescribed by customary international law. The Tribunal is of the opinion that in the
instant case the Treaty standard is not different from that required under international law
concerning both the stability and predictability of the legal and business framework of the
investment. To this extent the Treaty standard can be equated with that under
international law as evidenced by the opinions of the various tribunals cited above." The
same reasoning was also adopted by the Tribunal in CMS Gas Transmission Co. v.
Argentina, Award 282-284 (May 12, 2005) (ICSID). These two decisions have been
strongly criticised in doctrine: T. Kill, Don't Cross the Streams: Past and Present
Overstatement of Customary International Law in Connection with Conventional Fair
and Equitable Treatment Obligations, 106(5) MICHIGAN LR 853 (2008); G. VAN HARTEN,
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 89 (2007). For a more recent
statement on this point: Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. Tanzania, Award T 592 (July
24, 2008) (ICSID).
110. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States), 1986 I.C.J. T 175 (June 27).
111. ADC Affiliate Ltd & ADC & ADMC Management Ltd v. Hungary, Award,
481 (Oct. 2, 2006), (ICSID).
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international law in the future. By their very nature, customary rules
evolve over time. Several investor-State arbitration tribunals have
recognised this phenomenon.11 2  The ICJ has also long-recognised the
possibility for treaties to assist in the crystallisation of new custom. 113
The recent work of the ILA explains that this is also possible in the
context of a succession of similar bilateral treaties:
It is difficult to imagine that, in normal circumstances,
"crystallization" as described above could be accomplished by the
drafting and conclusion of a single bilateral treaty. So far as
concerns a succession of bilateral treaties, again there is certainly no
presumption that they will have assisted in the crystallization of an
emerging norm. But it is possible that in certain circumstances this
could be the case, for instance where the bilateral treaties are the
means of adding precision to a general customary norm.114
The repetitive enunciation of some of the standards of protection
existing under BITs may be the starting point of State practice which will
eventually become custom. A treaty provision may, indeed, provide the
impulse for the formation of new custom. 1 5 In the words of one writer,
numerous BITs providing for very similarly drafted standards of
protection will "consolidate a lowest common denominator of protection
of foreign investment" and "these treaties may be evidence of State
practice and provide a formidable impulse to the development of
customary international law." 1
16
112. ADF, supra note 32, 179, stating that custom is "constantly in a process of
development." See also UPS, supra note 39, 84 ("the obligations imposed by
customary international law may and do evolve"); Mondev, supra note 17, 117 ("It
would be surprising if this practice [the numerous BITs] and the vast number of
provisions it reflects were to be interpreted as meaning no more than the Neer Tribunal
(in a very different context) meant in 1927."); Pope & Talbot, supra note 78, 59 ("it is a
facet of international law that customary international law evolves through state
practice").
113. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 37, 63. See also Fisheries
Jurisdiction case (United Kingdom v. Iceland), 1974 I.C.J., 3 at 51-52 (June 25);
Continental Shelf case (Tunisia v Libya), 1982 I.C.J., 18 at 24 (Feb. 24).
114. ILA, supra note 36, at 50 (emphasis in the original). See also Principle no. 26:
"Multilateral treaties can assist in the 'crystallization' of emerging rules of customary
international law. But there is no presumption that they do." (at 49).
115. Id., 46, Principle no. 24: "Multilateral treaties can provide the impulse or model
for the formation of new customary rules through State practice. In other words, they can
be the historic ('material') source of a customary rule. However, there is no presumption
that they do so."
116. Gazzini, supra note 20, 704. See also Kishoiyian, supra note 20, 374 ("It is
important to note that there are some principles that are common to almost all the BITs
and thus by and large evince the practice of States. Effectively, there is utility to the
BITs in this regard in formulating legal principles that may become customary intentional
law. Whereas there may not be agreement on some of these principles at the international
level, the BITs contribute incrementally to the crystallisation of customary international
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V. THE REMAINING FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF CUSTOM IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
A recent paper by the OECD on expropriation stated that as a result
of the growing number of BITs providing for a comprehensive set of
protections to foreign investors the debate about the legal protection
existing under customary law had now become irrelevant:
Two decades ago, the disputes before the courts and the discussions
in academic literature focused mainly on the standard of
compensation and measuring of expropriated value. The divergent
views of the developed and developing countries raised issues
regarding the formation and evolution of customary law. Today, the
more positive attitude of countries around the world toward foreign
investment and the proliferation of bilateral treaties and other
investment agreements requiring prompt, adequate and effective
compensation for expropriation of foreign investments have large!
deprived that debate ofpractical significanceforforeign investors.
1
This paper argues, on the contrary, that the question of the
formation and the evolution of customary law in international investment
law is very much still significant.'1 8 As explained by the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal in the Amoco case, "the rules of customary law may be
useful in order to fill in possible lacunae of the treaty, to ascertain the
meaning of undefined terms in the text or, more generally, to aid the
interpretation and implementation of its provision." 119 These reasons,
and others, will now be briefly examined. 20
A. Custom is the Applicable Legal Regime in the Absence of any BIT
However numerous BITs may be, it remains that they certainly do
not cover the whole spectrum of possible bilateral treaty relationship
between states. According to one writer, BITs in fact only cover some
law which ultimately may be distilled into treaty law."). According to Sornarajah, supra
note 52, 206, it is "possible that, if there is a concordance of standards in these [BITs],
such standards on which there is consistent agreement evidenced by such treaties could
become international law." He also believes that "it may be claimed that the treaties
stabilise practices that have existed and contribute to the creation of customary principles
in the areas in the future." However, he argues that "there is so much divergence in the
standards in [BITs] that it is premature to conclude that they give rise to any significant
rule of international law."
117. OECD, supra note 18, at 2 (emphasis added).
118. C. Schreuer & R. Dolzer, supra note 19, 16-17, asking rhetorically the question
whether "the elucidation of the state of customary law is no longer a central concern of
academic commentators" and concluding that "the issue certainly remains alive."
119. Amoco, supra note 77, 112.
120. The issue is examined in details by Gazzini, supra note 21, 691.
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13 percent of the total bilateral relationship between States worldwide. 
121
For instance, Canada entered into BITs with only 23 countries. 1
22
Since a BIT is only binding on the parties to the treaty and not on
third parties, 2 3 the limited worldwide geographical scope of BITs
necessarily results in gaps in the legal protection to foreign
investments. 124 Thus, a foreign investor originating from a State which
has not entered into a BIT with the State where the investment is made
will not be given the legal protection which would have otherwise been
typically offered under such treaty. 125 Custom, however, applies to all
States, including those which have not entered into any BITs.
Customary rules can therefore be invoked by any foreign investor
irrespective of whether its State of origin has entered into a BIT with the
country where it makes its investment. This is the first reason why the
determination of the content of custom remains so fundamental, even in
this age of BIT proliferation.
B. Many BITs Make Explicit Reference to Custom
Another reason for the remaining importance of custom is that
several BITs make explicit reference to the application of "customary
international law."' 26 An arbitral tribunal must necessarily determine the
content of a custom rule when faced with a specific provision, like the
one found in the recent Canada-Peru BIT, which indicates that the
standard of treatment to be accorded to an investor is that existing under
"customary international law," including the fair and equitable treatment
and full protection and security. 127 The Model BIT adopted by Canada
and Norway contains a very similar clause. 128 The U.S. Model BIT and
recent treaties entered into by the United States also contain a similar
clause as well as other explicit references to custom. 129  Several other
121. Id.
122. In addition, Canada is also a party to NAFTA, supra note 10.
123. Art. 34, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 45.
124. C. Schreuer & R. Dolzer, supra note 19, 17.
125. That does not mean, however, that such investor will have no legal protection
whatsoever. The investor will still be able to rely on contractual rights as well as those
existing under the legislation of the host State.
126. McLachlan, supra note 21, 399.
127. Article 5(1) of the Canada-Peru BIT provides that "each party shall accord to
covered investments treatment in accordance with the customary international law
minimum standard of treatment of aliens, including fair and equitable treatment and full
protection and security." (emphasis added).
128. Art. 5, Norway Model BIT; Art. 5, Canada Model BIT.
129. Art. 5(1), US Model BIT (2004). Annex A to the Model BIT further provides
that "customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens refers to all
customary international law principles that protect the economic rights and interests of
aliens." Similarly, Annex B to the US Model BIT indicates that Article 6 on
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treaties entered into by other States also contain similar language
referring to custom. 
130
Similarly, custom is also essential when it is referred to in an
official note of interpretation of a treaty provision. One example is the
meaning of NAFTA Article 1105 as specified by NAFTA Free Trade
Commission's Notes of Interpretation.13' To those treaties should also
be added others where reference is made to the application of general
rules and principles of international law used as an analogy to custom. 
132
The importance of custom is also undeniable in the context of a tribunal
being required to interpret treaty provisions in accordance with
customary international law. 1
33
Finally, there is another situation where a tribunal would have to
take into account the content of custom. Many BITs entered into by the
Netherlands provide for the application of custom whenever it leads to a
more favourable treatment than the one existing under the treaty. 134 This
expropriation "is intended to reflect customary international law concerning the
obligation of States with respect to expropriation." Explicit references to custom are also
found in recent FTA entered into by the United States with Australia (2004), Central
America (CAFTA, 2004), Chile (2003), Morocco (2004) and Singapore (2003, see the
side letter of 6 May 2003). See also the most recent BITs entered by the United States
with Uruguay (2005) and Rwanda (2008).
130. For instance, the Belgium/Luxembourg-Peru BIT (Art. 3); Korea-Singapore FTA
(Art. 10.5); Chile-Australia FTA (Art. 10.5); Mexico-Czech Rep. BIT (Protocol);
Australia-Mexico BIT (Protocol).
131. Although Article 1105(1) simply refers to "treatment in accordance with
international law," the Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, NAFTA
FTC (July 31, 2001), indicate that this provision "prescribes the customary international
law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be
afforded to investments of investors of another Party." (emphasis added). See also
Canada-Chile FTA (1997), Art. G-05 and the subsequent "Notes of Interpretation of
Certain Chapter G Provisions" by the CCFTA Free Trade Commission, Oct. 31, 2002).
132. For instance, Guatemala-Czech Rep. BIT (Art. 2(2)) refers to "treatment less
favorable than that required by international law."
133. For instance, Korea-Singapore FTA (art. 20.2(5): "The Parties and the arbitral
panel appointed under this Chapter shall interpret and apply the provisions of this
Agreement in the light of the objectives of this Agreement and in accordance with
customary rules of public international law").
134. For instance, Art. 3(5) of the Netherlands-Czech Rep. BIT: "If the provisions of
law of either Contracting Party or obligations under international law existing at present
or established hereafter between the Contracting Parties in addition to the present
Agreement contain rules, whether general or specific, entitling investments by investors
of the other Contracting Party to a treatment more favourable than is provided for by the
present Agreement, such rules shall to the extent that they are more favourable prevail
over the present Agreement." Similarly drafted provisions are also found in many other
BITs entered into by the Netherlands.
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specific feature is also contained in the Model BIT adopted by India,'35
as well as several BITs entered into by Switzerland. 
136
C. Custom has a Gap-Filling Role
Another area showing the importance to determine the content of
customary international law is filling gaps in treaties. Thus, whenever a
BIT is silent on a particular legal issue, the answer will be found in
customary international law. 137  Thus, custom "operates in a residual
way." 138  Several tribunals have resorted to custom to fill gaps. For
instance, faced with a BIT which "did not deal with the legal elements
necessary for the legitimate invocation of a state of necessity," the
Sempra Tribunal held that "rule governing such questions will thus be
found under customary law." 139 Similarly, the ADC Tribunal concluded
that since the BIT did not "contain any lex specialis rules" governing
"the issue of the standard for assessing damages in the case of an
unlawful expropriation," it was "required to apply the default standard
contained in customary international law in the present case." 140  For
instance, since BITs are typically silent on the rules of attribution of
conduct to a State, Tribunals frequently refer to the International Law
Commission's Articles on State Responsibility as a codification of
customary international law on the matter. 1
41
Far from being obsolete, the question of the content of customary
international law remains of fundamental importance.
135. Art. 13.
136. See, inter alia, the BITs entered into with Venezuela (art. 11), Tanzania, (art.
11), Namibia (art. 8.1), India (art. 12), Mozambique (Art. 11), Serbia-Montenegro (art.
10), Philippines (Art. 10), Oman (Art. 10.1), Mongolia, (art. 10,1), Mauritius (art. 11(1),
Libya (art. 10), Jordan (art. 11), Guatemala (art. 10, United Arab Emirates (art. 11),
Lebanon (art. 9) (the list is not exhaustive).
137. McLachlan, supra note 21, 400; Gazzini, supra note 21, 711; Cai, supra note 20
32.
138. ADM, supra note 100, 110: "Chapter 11 of the NAFTA constitutes lex
specialis in respect to its express content, but customary international law continues to
govern all matters not covered by Chapter 11."
139. Sempra Energy International v. Argentina, Award 378 (Sept. 28, 2007)
(ICSID). See also Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States, Award
226 (June 26, 2003) (ICSID): "There is no language in those articles [NAFTA Articles
1116 and 1117], or anywhere else in the treaty, which deals with the question of whether
nationality must continue to the time of resolution of the claim. It is that silence in the
Treaty that requires the application of customary international law to resolve the question
of the need for continuous national identity."
140. ADC, supra note 111, 483. See also ADM, supra note 100, 122.
141. Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, Award 69 (Oct. 12, 2005) (ICSID): "[w]hile
those Draft Articles are not binding, they are widely regarded as a codification of
customary international law." See also Biwater, supra note 109, 773-774 (majority).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The conclusions of this paper can be summarised as follows.
1. The question of the treatment to be accorded to foreign investors
under customary international law has long been contentious between
developed and developing states. As a result, no broad international
consensus emerged as to the existing basic legal protections for foreign
investors. Consequently, States have entered into BITs, containing
comprehensive protection for foreign investors, precisely because of the
lack of development of relevant custom rules in the field of the
international investment law.
2. What is the impact of these 2,500 BITs on the development of
customary international law in this area? Some authors argue that these
BITs represent the "new" customary international law and that their
content is basically the same.
3. This paper rejects this proposition. The main reason for rejecting
it is based on the fact that BITs are missing the two necessary elements
of customary international law. First, these BITs do not represent any
consistent State practice. For instance, the inconsistency of State
practice is undeniable with respect to the definition of corporate
nationality under these BITs. Second, BITs also lack any opinio juris.
States sign BITs clearly not out of a sense of legal obligation, but for
economic motive, i.e. to attract foreign investments and to offer
protection to their investors doing business abroad.
4. It nevertheless remains that BITs will necessarily influence
customary international law. Thus, BITs will contribute to the
consolidation of already existing custom rules. BITs will also contribute
to the crystallisation of new rules of customary international law in the
future.
5. In this age of BITs proliferation, the determination of the content
of customary rules of international investment law remains of
fundamental importance. Thus, custom is the applicable legal regime
between a foreign investor and the host State in the absence of any BIT.
The content of custom remains also essential in cases where BITs make
explicit reference to custom. Finally, custom has a gap-filling role
whenever a BIT is silent on a particular legal issue.
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